Prior studies conclude that one of the economic costs of complying with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is lower corporate investment. U.S. firms with a public float above $75 million during [2002][2003][2004] had to comply with Section 404 of SOX, whereas firms with a smaller public float in each of those three years could delay compliance until at least 2007. Using this setting as a natural quasiexperiment to isolate the effects that were uniquely due to Section 404 of SOX, we compare investment activities for the two groups of firms around the $75 million threshold. In contrast to prior studies, we do not find a reduction in investment for firms that had to comply with SOX relative to those that could delay compliance. Our results challenge the conventional wisdom that SOX caused firms to decrease corporate investment.
Introduction
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 by the U.S. Congress resulted in the most significant change in securities regulation since the Securities Act of 1933. In response to a string of high-profile corporate scandals, the main goal of SOX was to strengthen corporate governance while improving disclosure quality and transparency. An unintended consequence, as some argue, is a reduction in investment activities that generate profits for shareholders and produce long-term economic growth (Brady, 2007) . A year after enactment, William Donaldson, former chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), stated that SOX would lead to a "loss of risk-taking zeal" due to a "huge preoccupation with the dangers and risks of making the slightest mistake." Several recent studies suggest that compliance with SOX caused companies to decrease investment (see Litvak, 2008; Shadab, 2008; Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter, 2010; and Kang, Liu, and Qi, 2010) . However, Leuz (2007) cautions about attributing these findings to SOX, pointing out that changes in market conditions and other concurrent events may have been at work and that it is crucial to find a control group-comparable U.S. firms that are not affected by SOX-to isolate the effects of SOX (see also Coates, 2007; Ball, 2009; and Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2009 ).
In this paper, we use a quasi-natural experiment to isolate the impact of SOX on corporate investment by comparing two groups of similar U.S. firms that are affected differently by the legislation.
Arguably the most demanding requirement of SOX is Section 404 (hereafter SOX404), which mandates that a firm's annual report filing include a "management report," in which management evaluates the firm's internal control system on financial reporting and discloses any "material weakness" found. The management report must be personally certified by the chief executive officer deficiencies in the regulations and in the enforcement process. Specifically, even though the certification requirements of SOX404 can, in theory, generate significant civil and criminal liabilities for CEOs and CFOs, in practice, only officers who certify financial statements knowing them to be materially misleading are in a position to face liability-and may escape any punishment, depending on other factors. 5 In addition, officers can protect themselves through directors' and officers' liability insurance to cover damages or defense costs resulting from a lawsuit for alleged wrongful acts while acting in their capacity as directors and officers for the organization. Third, Ball (2009, page 314) questions the effectiveness of the new legislation regarding the expanded liability of officers and directors because, prior to SOX, CEOs and CFOs were already required to sign and attest to the veracity of financial statements and faced heavy penalties for knowingly attesting to false certification (see also Coffee, 2007; Coates, 2007) .
Given the importance of investment to the growth of firms and of the economy in general, it is important to ascertain whether or not SOX has negatively affected firms' main activities.
Unfortunately, uniquely identifying the impact of SOX404 on corporate investment during a period characterized by other significant events-including the burst of the tech bubble in 2000/2001, the recession following 9/11, new NYSE and NASDAQ rules, and the Enron and WorldCom scandalsis a challenge for researchers. These events alone could have caused firms to become more cautious 5 Corporate officers who rely in "good faith" on reports from subordinates or from outside auditors and accountants are not likely to be subject to civil or criminal liability themselves. As a result of this "reliance defense," very few cases in which plaintiffs bring actions against defendant corporate officers proceed beyond a motion to dismiss in the very early stages of litigation. In the vast majority of cases where plaintiffs allege violations pursuant to §302, the motions are dismissed. Only two motions appear to have survived the motion-to-dismiss stage as of May 2011: (1) Bear Stearns Securities Derivative Litigation, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6026, dated Jan. 19, 2011, and (2) LDK Solar Securities Derivative Litigation, 584 F. Supp. 2d 1230; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42425, dated May 29, 2008 . Although neither of these cases has been adjudicated to a final judgment, they did survive early dismissal. We thank Brian Quinn, Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College, for providing us with this information. 6 Cases in which directors of a company are required to personally pay for their misconduct are also rare (e.g., Davidoff, 2011). in their investment decisions as Coates (2007) suggests. The key is to find a control group of firms that were not affected by SOX404, but were subject to the same concurrent events.
In this paper, we use a quasi-natural experiment to isolate the impact of SOX on corporate investment by comparing two groups of similar U.S. firms that were affected differently by the This allows for a difference-in-difference research design, which should mitigate potential biases from unobservable factors that might be correlated with investment. If SOX404 caused firms to engage in less risk-taking behavior, as suggested by prior studies, we expect the level of investment for filers to drop in the post-SOX period relative to that of the control group. But if the change in risk-taking behavior is due to the general economic conditions or if filers are able to enjoy greater transparency and lower cost of capital due to SOX, then the level of investment for filers would not drop-and might even increase-in the post-SOX period compared to that of the control group.
Using a sample of approximately 440 unique firms for the sample period of 1994 through 2006, we first find that post-SOX investment by filers falls from the pre-SOX levels; the magnitude 7 Securities and Exchange Act Rule 12b-2 defines "public float" as the aggregate market value of the issuer's outstanding voting and non-voting common equity held by non-affiliates. An "affiliate" is a person who, directly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with the person specified. The term "control" means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.
of the reduction is similar to that documented in earlier studies of firms larger than those in our study.
However, post-SOX investment by the control group also dropped over the same period, and we do not find that filers reduced their investment significantly more than the control group did. Moreover, we show that the decrease in investment for both groups starts in 1999, not in 2003 when SOX became effective. These results are consistent with both filer firms and control firms reducing investment to adjust to a business and legal environment that had gone through substantial changes prior to the introduction of SOX.
In addition, we use an instrumental variables approach to examine investment activities in 2004, the first year of SOX compliance, when the difference between the two groups should be most pronounced. Specifically, we use firms' public float in 2002, along with stock returns and stock return volatilities, to instrument firms' compliance status in 2004 (i.e., whether a firm becomes a filer or not). 8 We find that the filers invest more after SOX than firms in the control group do, which suggests that filers may actually have benefited from the increased disclosures mandated by SOX404.
Our results thus are inconsistent with the hypothesis that Section 404 of SOX reduces investment for firms that had to comply.
We then explore whether the impact of SOX404 varies cross-sectionally for our sample firms.
First, we test whether our findings are limited to small firms; we do not find that the impact of SOX404 on large firms' investment is statistically different from that on small firms in our sample.
Second, we examine large-scale acquisition, an activity considered to have adverse effects on a firm's internal control system, and do not find that filers make fewer acquisitions than control group firms do after SOX. Third, we analyze whether investment decreased significantly more for firms with a higher percentage of insider holdings, as these firms would presumably be more concerned about the potential liability costs associated with risky investments that could compromise internal controls.
We find that filers with a higher percentage of insider ownership (measured before SOX) decrease investment less, not more, in the post-SOX period than filers with lower levels of insider holdings.
We only find evidence of a negative impact of Section 404 on investment for filers with material internal-control weaknesses (58 firms-or 15.9 percent-of our filers), possibly due to the fact that these firms had to reallocate investment capital to fix their internal control systems. Our results are also robust to controlling for other concurrent corporate governance events, such as the new New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq exchange listing requirements regarding the number of independent directors. Overall, these results cast doubt that SOX increased the level of risk-aversion among executives and directors.
This paper contributes to the debate over the effects of SOX on firms' investment decisions and challenges the extant evidence that SOX had an adverse effect on investment. Bargeron et al. (2010) and Kang et al. (2010) use UK firms as a benchmark and find that U.S. firms decreased their investment more than UK firms. Litvak (2008) compares foreign cross-listed firms in the U.S. (thus bound by U.S. law) to similar non-cross-listed firms and finds that the risk of those firms subject to SOX declined after SOX. In these papers, however, a causal link is subject to differences in legal rules, economic conditions, and contemporaneous events across countries.
Our paper also adds to the literature that focuses on the impact of SOX on small firms although we do not find any differential investment behavior across small and large firms. Our sample of small firms is particularly relevant as Gao et al. (2009) show that small firms have an incentive to manipulate their public float to avoid complying with SOX404 and several studies show that the compliance costs of SOX404 are a significant burden to small firms (e.g., Engel, Hayes, and Wang, 2007; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Kamar et al., 2007; Kang et al., 2010; and Alexander et al., 2010) .
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the institutional background and timeline of Section 404 of SOX. Section 3 describes the sample selection and data.
Section 4 presents the empirical tests and results. Section 5 offers additional robustness tests and Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Background and Sequence of Events
In this section, we provide a brief description of the institutional background and sequence of key events regarding SOX and, in particular, Section 404 (see Figure 1 ). We then explain why the implementation of Section 404 provides an empirical setting that allows us to isolate its effects from those of other confounding events. between 6000 and 6900) and regulated firms (with SIC codes between 4900 and 4939). The public float equals the value of the common stock owned by outside investors, which we hand-collect from the cover page of each firm's 10-K report. Accounting and financial information is obtained from
Compustat. Several studies show that SOX404 compliance costs lead many small firms to deregister their common stock ("go dark") or to go private so as to avoid complying with SOX (see Leuz, Triantis, and Wang, 2008; Engel et al., 2007) . These decisions can induce a survivorship bias that could lead us to find no effect across the filers and the control group if the filers most affected by Section 404 delisted. To alleviate such concerns, we use a constant sample of filer and control firms with available data for the full sample period of 1994 to 2006. Our final sample has approximately 3,700 firm-year observations covering that period. Bargeron et al. (2010) argue that if a firm engages in less risk-taking behavior due to SOX then the amount of cash it holds would increase and the volatility of its stock returns decrease. Table 1 shows that short-term investments scaled by total assets (CASH) and the standard deviation of returns (STD) are also not statistically different across the two groups.
Descriptive Statistics
In summary, filers exhibit relatively lower levels of investment and higher accounting performance and are larger than control firms prior to the 2002 enactment of SOX. However, the growth prospects do not seem to be different across the two groups. which raises questions about prior findings that U.S. corporations became more risk-averse after SOX. Figure 5 reports the trend in CASH holdings. For all three groups, the level of cash holding increases throughout the entire period, while the rate of increase seems to decline slightly in the post-SOX period. The argument that firms have become more risk-averse suggests that they prefer to hold more of the risk-free asset-cash. However, the evidence suggests that the rate of increase in cash holdings actually declined after SOX, particularly for filers. Finally, Figure 6 shows how the average firm's stock volatility evolved throughout the sample period. Volatility increased up to 2000, when the tech bubble burst, then steadily declined. To the extent that the decrease in volatility is found across all the groups, including the control group, it calls into question whether it was caused by any risk-aversion attributable to SOX404.
Empirical Tests and Results

The Impact of Section 404 on Filers versus Control Firms Using a Difference-in-Differences Approach
To test whether compliance to SOX's Section 404 impacted firm's willingness to take risks, we estimate the following regression models:
We follow Bargeron et al. (2010) and measure Y i,t , a proxy for a firm's willingness to take risks, using the following five variables: CAPEX, R&D, INVEST, CASH, and STD. The control variables used are EBIT, MTB, and DEBT, as in Bargeron et al. (2010) . EBIT and MTB are included to account for any variation in investment or cash holdings that is related to a firm's profitability or growth opportunities. The STD regressions include EBIT, MTB, and DEBT as controls to account for the effect of a firm's profitability, growth prospects, and debt on the volatility of its stock. Bargeron et al. (2010) also include GDP growth and an index return to control for the impact of the UK and U.S. economies' growth on the variables of interest. We do not include these variables because our sample consists only of U.S. firms; GDP growth and the index return are subsumed by the inclusion of the year fixed effects. Inclusion of the S&P500 index and GDP growth yields qualitatively similar results. Table 2 ) and Kang et al. (2010, Table 2) for U.S. firms. 12 However, Columns 2, 4, and 6 show that the coefficients on Post-SOX*Filer are not statistically different from zero, suggesting that the change in investment during the post-SOX period for filers is not statistically different from that for the control group, which casts doubt on the effect of Section 404 on a firm's level of investment. Moreover, the coefficients on the Post-SOX indicator remain negative and significant suggesting that both filers and control group decrease investment in the post-SOX period for reasons other than the regulation.
The results for CASH are reported in Columns 7 and 8. Contrary to the findings in Bargeron et al. (2010) , we do not find that CASH increased significantly post-SOX for the filers, nor when compared to the control group. Our finding that small firms do not tend to hold more of this risk-free asset in the post-SOX period differs from the finding in Bargeron et al. (2010) . The difference is due to the fact that we include year dummies to account for the time-trend identified in Figure 5 . If we exclude the year dummies, the coefficient on Post-SOX becomes positive and statistically significant, while the remaining coefficients remain qualitatively the same.
When analyzing the impact of SOX404 on stock volatility for both filers and control firms in Column 10, we find that the coefficient on Post-SOX is still negative (-0.012) and is statistically significant, providing evidence that both filers' and control firms' stock volatility declined following SOX. However, the results in Column 10 show that the post-SOX decline in volatility is marginally smaller for filers than for control firms; the coefficient on Post-SOX*Filer is 0.002 (t-statistic=1.72).
This casts doubt on the view that SOX404 discouraged risk-taking behavior on the part of firms that were subject to compliance (the filers), causing a more significant decline in stock volatility for these firms.
We further investigate whether the lack of a statistically significant difference in risk-taking and investment behavior between filers and control firms is due to a lack of statistical power to detect such a difference. First, we check whether the lack of statistical significance in Table 2 for the coefficient Post-SOX*Filer is due to a high correlation between this variable and Post-SOX.
Although the correlation between these two variables is 0.73, excluding Post-SOX from the regressions in Columns 2, 4, 6, 9, and 10 yields very similar results. 13 Second, the economic significance of the coefficient associated with Post-SOX*Filer is about one-fifth of the economic significance of the Post-SOX coefficient. During the post-SOX period, CAPEX decreased by 2.4 percent for both filers and control firms. However, the incremental economic impact on CAPEX for the filers relative to the control firms is a decrease of only 0.5 percent. Because the size of the coefficient estimate is not affected by the power of the test, we conclude that it is the lack of economic significance and not of statistical power that primarily explains our results.
The Impact of Section 404 on Filers versus Control Firms Using Instrumental Variables
To avoid endogeneity concerns, we define firms as the treatment group ( Specifically, we estimate the following IV model:
First, we need to find instruments to estimate whether the firm will become a filer; these instruments must be highly correlated with the probability of becoming a filer but not with the 
The Impact of SOX's Section 404 on Small versus Large Filers
To investigate whether the above findings are driven by the fact that small firms' investment levels and risk-taking behaviors are inherently different from those of larger firms, we replicate Table   2 using a sample that includes both small accelerated filers and large accelerated filers. Table 4 14 14 Several studies find that SOX compliance imposed higher relative costs on smaller firms (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007 and Kang et al., 2010) .
Other Cross-sectional Evidence
In this subsection, we examine whether the impact of SOX's Section 404 on filers varies for those with a higher proportion of insider holdings and for those with internal control problems (or material weaknesses).
Filers with a Large Proportion of Insider Holdings
We investigate whether filers with a higher proportion of insider holdings-and presumably a greater concern about potential liability costs associated with Section 404 compliance-invest less than filers with a lower proportion of insider holdings. Specifically, if SOX404 reduces incentives to engage in risk-taking activities, this negative effect would be more pronounced in firms with higher insider ownership since the risk-adverse executives would have more personal wealth at stake. We Table 5 shows the results of this test. We find some evidence that filers with a high level of insider holdings invest more, not less, during the post-SOX period than do filers with a lower level of insider holdings (coefficients of 0.016 (t-value of 1.73) for CAPEX and 0.036 (t-value of 1.81) for
INVEST).
To the extent that a high level of insider holdings reflects the higher potential costs to which insiders are exposed, these results cast doubt that SOX404 has discouraged risk-taking among executives and directors.
Filers with Material Weaknesses
Eldridge and Kealey (2005) Table 6 presents the results. We do not include firm fixed effects in Table 6 because about 60 percent of the firms reporting a material weakness in their internal controls do so for two or more years during the post-SOX period. The inclusion of firm fixed effects would prevent us from detecting any statistically significant difference because disclosure of a material weakness is a firm characteristic that is weakly time-invariant. Consistent with our prediction, we find that filers with material weaknesses do decrease their investment subsequent to Section 404 compliance, but that filers without material weaknesses do not invest less than the control firms. Economically, the total investment scaled by assets of a filer with a material weakness decreases by 3.8 percent more than those of a filer without a material weakness. This result needs to be interpreted cautiously because the classification of filers with material weaknesses suffers from potential endogeneity biases, as these firms are classified after SOX404 is implemented. It is possible that firms that decrease their investment because of lack of growth opportunities or profitability are also more likely to report a material weakness, in which case it maybe the lack of future growth prospects rather than reporting a material weakness that leads these firms to cut investment.
Robustness Tests
Section 404 is more likely to cause internal control problems for filers that grow through acquisition, since acquired firms may have poor accounting systems. To investigate whether filers reduced their level of acquisition more than the control firms did, we replicate the results in Table 2 using acquisitions as our measure of investment level. The (untabulated) results are consistent with those in Table 2 ; we do not find that filers exhibit significantly lower levels of acquisition than control firms do.
Recent studies show that U.S. firms are pursuing growth strategies by outsourcing and by taking large equity holdings in other companies as a form of investment, approaches which are not necessarily reflected in larger capital expenditures or R&D investments (e.g., Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan, 2004; McCarthy, 2002) . This change in investment strategy raises the question of whether this paper's findings, using capital expenditures and R&D expenditures as measures of investment, accurately portray the current risk-taking characteristics of U.S. firms. To investigate the possibility that they do not, we replicate Table 2 and Equation 2, using three variables to measure investment that are independent of investment strategy: employment growth, asset growth, and sales growth. The (untabulated) results show that the employment and sales growth for both filers and nonfilers decline during the post-SOX period (while asset growth remain stable for both groups), but the decline is not statistically different across filer and control firms. The results are thus consistent with those presented above.
Even though the focus of our study is on the impact of Section 404 on corporate investment and risk taking activities, it is possible that other corporate governance provisions that were adopted around the time SOX was enacted could have had an impact on firms' behavior. In particular, Bargeron et al. (2010) show that the decline in investment levels after SOX for U.S. firms is related to the board structure prior to SOX. While SOX require independence of the auditing committee of the board, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq revised their exchange listing rules around the time SOX was enacted to increase the required percentage of independent directors on corporate boards and board committees, namely auditing, nominating and compensation. These NYSE and NASDAQ board independence requirements were enforced for all firms (filer and control group firms). Moreover, Cohen, Dey and Lys (2007) examine the effects of SOX on compensation contracts and argue that CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity decreased after SOX leading firms to reduce their investment levels. To account for the effects of changes in board structure and CEO's compensation contracts on firm's corporate investment, we rerun the tests in Table 2 adding the following controls: the percentage of insiders in the board of directors and the percentage of equity in CEO's total pay. We further include board size as an additional control variable to capture the level of monitoring of the CEO's actions by the board as some studies argue that larger boards can provide more effective monitoring when the CEO's opportunity to consume private benefits is high (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 2008; Boone et al., 2007) . We hand collect these data for The sample in this study covers firms with a float between $50 million and $150 million in order to have a large enough sample of similar firms. However, one can question whether our results are due to a lack of power to detect statistically significant differences between the filers and the control group due to the lower proportion of control firms in the main sample. To address this concern, we redefine the sample to be composed of firms with a public float between $50 million and $100 million and between $25 million and $150 million and find that the (untabulated) results remain qualitatively the same.
Conclusion
The impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley act on corporate investment has attracted significant attention from both practitioners and academics since its enactment in 2002. Prior studies attribute the decrease in corporate investment in the U.S. to SOX and argue that it results from managers' unwillingness to take risks due to the increase in litigation and compliance costs associated with SOX. However, a stream of literature suggests that SOX could actually have a positive impact on corporate investment as investors benefit from greater transparency conferred by improved disclosure, which can lead to lower cost of capital. Moreover, because the post-SOX period is also a period of major changes in corporate governance and of other significant events, it is a challenge to uniquely identify the impact of SOX on corporate investment.
We use a natural experiment to identify a control group to isolate the effects of Section 404, arguably SOX's most demanding requirement, on corporate investment. We compare the impact of SOX404 on a sample of small firms with public float just above the $75 million threshold to the impact on firms with a public float just below that threshold. Filers are required to comply with Section 404, while non-filers are not, leading to natural treatment (filers) and control (non-filer)
groupings. Even though both groups significantly decrease their investment in the post-SOX period (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) relative to that of the pre-SOX period (1994-2002), we do not find that firms complying with SOX404 decreased their level of investment to a greater or lesser degree than firms in the control group did. We also find that our results are not a characteristic of small firms only, as we do not find that the impact of SOX404 on large firms' investment is statistically different from the impact on small firms. We further show that for small filers, for the control group, and for large filers, the decrease in investment starts in 1999, not in 2003 when SOX became effective. In fact, when we use an instrumental variables approach to estimate which firms will comply with SOX404
in 2004, we find that the filers actually invest more than the control group do after SOX404 is implemented, suggesting that filers may actually have benefited from the newly mandated disclosures.
Our cross-sectional and robustness tests further corroborate the above results. We examine large-scale acquisition and do not find that filers make fewer acquisitions after SOX than the control group does. We also find that filers with a higher percentage of insider ownership and thus greater concern about litigation costs invest more, not less, in the post-SOX period than filers with lower levels of insider holdings do. Only for filers with material internal-control weaknesses do we find some evidence of a decrease in investment, probably because these firms had to reallocate investment capital to fix their internal control systems. Taken together, our results challenge the conventional wisdom that SOX "had a chilling effect on risk-taking" by publicly traded firms (Bargeron et al., 2010 College.
APPENDIX A Definitions of Variables
Float Public float reported on the company's annual report.
CAPEX
Capital expenditures divided by the average assets for the last two years.
R&D
Research and development expenditures for the year divided by the average assets for the last two years.
INVEST
The sum of CAPEX and R&D.
CASH
The year-end level of cash and short-term investments divided by average assets for the last two years.
STD
The standard deviation of the returns for the year.
EBIT
The earnings before interest and taxes divided by average assets.
MTB
The year-end market value of the assets divided by the year-end book value of assets.
DEBT
The average total debt divided by the average market value of total assets.
ASSETS
The year-end book value of the assets.
MKT CAP
Fiscal year-end stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding.
REVENUES
Total sales for the year.
STKRET Buy-and-hold stock return for the year.
Pre-SOX
An indicator variable equal to one for the years 1994 through 2002, zero otherwise. 
Post-SOX
Weakness
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm reports a material weakness in its internal control systems in at least one of the quarters during the fiscal year and equal to zero otherwise. (2006) values for all the observations in the pre-SOX (post-SOX). For the calculation of total CEO pay we consider three components: cash and bonuses, restricted stock grants and stock options. The value of restricted stock is calculated as the number of shares granted during the fiscal year multiplied by the average stock price in the granting year. Following prior work (e.g., Core and Guay 2001), we use the Black-Scholes formula to convert the number of options granted into a dollar value. To calculate the value of the options, we use the average stock-return volatility prior to the granting year, the dividend yield during the granting year, a time-to-maturity of seven years, and the mid-year yield on 1-year Treasuries as the riskfree rate
Board Insider
ASSETS Growth
The percentage annual growth in book value of the assets.
MKT CAP Growth
The percentage annual growth in market capitalization.
Employment Growth
The percentage annual growth in the number of employees.
SALES Growth
The percentage annual growth in total sales. [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , as well as summary statistics for the differences between the pre-and post-SOX periods for the two groups of firms. CAPEX is capital expenditures divided by the average assets for the year. R&D is research and development expenditures divided by the average assets for the year. INVEST is the sum of CAPEX and R&D. CASH is the year-end level of cash and short-term investments divided by average assets. STD is the standard deviation of the returns for the year. EBIT is the earnings before interest and taxes divided by average assets. MTB is the year-end market value of the assets divided by the year-end book value of assets. DEBT is the average total debt divided by the average market value of total assets. These variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. N represents number of firms. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix A. P-values are based on results from difference in means tests and from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for differences in medians. Table 2 and not reported); and firm and year fixed effects (not reported). All variables are defined in Appendix A. The control variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels and are lagged one year in the regressions. T-stats are reported below coefficients based on standard errors clustered by firm. The symbols ***, **, and * denote two-sided statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Filers and Control Firms in 2002
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